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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 5, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States sur-
prised the international human rights community by making a
procedural order for a re-hearing of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.1
This case had been brought under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") by
Nigerian plaintiffs against British, Dutch, and Nigerian multinational
oil companies for aiding and abetting human rights abuses committed
by the Nigerian government. 2 The order called for new argument on
the extraterritorial application of the ATS, effectively transforming the
plaintiffs' appeal, which had questioned corporate liability under inter-
national law, into a case with the potential to reverse over three
decades of precedent.3 For more than thirty years, U.S. courts have
applied the ATS extraterritorially,4 including to so-called "foreign-
cubed" 5 cases involving a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign defendant for
violations of international law committed in the territory of a foreign
sovereign. The Supreme Court must now decide whether federal or
international law prevents the ATS from extending beyond U.S.
borders.
Federal courts in the United States have to date been engaged
in an exercise of universal civil jurisdiction when deciding extrater-
ritorial ATS cases that have no traditional jurisdictional connections or
factual nexus with the nation. The development of the modern
principle of universal jurisdiction reflects the radical transformation of
the subject matter of international law. Its primary concern used to be
inter-state relations, but after World War II, the focus has largely been
on the protection of individuals from human rights abuses committed
by their own governments, as well as the enforcement of criminal
responsibility for grave breaches of international law such as war
I John Bellinger, Stop Press: Supreme Court Orders Kiobel Reargued to Address
Extraterritoriality, LAWFAREBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2012/03/stop-press-supreme-court-orders-kiobel-reargued-to-
address-extraterritoriality/.
2 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012).
4 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).




crimes and crimes against humanity.6 Universal jurisdiction is recog-
nized under public international law as the basis for a state to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction over the most heinous international crimes
committed by anyone, regardless of their location;7 indeed, it is
cautiously promoted by the international community as a tool in the
fight against impunity-the bringing to justice of the world's worst
human rights abusers in an era of individual responsibility and
accountability.8 Yet its use remains politically and diplomatically
sensitive, and the scope of its application is highly contested,
particularly in the realm of private transnational litigation as opposed
to criminal prosecutions by a state.9 This essay shall demonstrate that
although there is no express rule of international law prohibiting the
extraterritorial application of the ATS in "foreign-cubed" cases, the
United States has stood alone in authorizing such an exercise of
universal civil jurisdiction. 10 Even if the Supreme Court in Kiobel does
find that foreign-cubed ATS claims alleging heinous violations of
international norms area valid exercise of universal civil jurisdiction
under international law, the ATS must still overcome the statutory
presumption against extraterritorial effect, which was recently
reaffirmed by the Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Limited."
6 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 154 (Leval, J., concurring).
7 Vaughan Lowe & Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 313, 326
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010).
Rosemary A. DiCarlo, Remarks at the Security Council Debate on International
Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law (Jan. 19, 2012) (transcript available at
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/182192.htm).
9 Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal
Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 155-57 (2006).
10 Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 3, 77 (Feb. 14) (Joint Separate Opinion) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case].
Recent developments in Canada and the Netherlands suggest that the principle of
universal civil jurisdiction may be gaining traction. In March 2012, Canada passed the
Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, which requires a "real and substantial connection
to Canada" but has been referred to as Canada's ATS. Rene Provost, Canada's Alien
Tort Statute, EJIL: TALK! (March 29, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org. The same month,
a Dutch court awarded 1 million euros to a Palestinian doctor imprisoned in Libya in
the first Dutch case in which the principle of universal civil jurisdiction has been used.
Dutch Compensates Palestinian for Libya Jail, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (March 28,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 17537597.
" Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
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If the ATS survives this challenge - a daunting one in that Morrison
overturned forty years of case law applying American securities laws
extraterritorially - the Court will have to address the lower courts'
failure to abide by its guidance in yet another case, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, which sought to restrict ATS claims to only the most widely-
condemned and well-defined international law violations.12
The First Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute in 1789 as
part of the Judiciary Act. 13 It grants U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations14 or a treaty of the United States." 5 The original
meaning of the ATS remains elusive; it is "a legal Lohengrin" in that
"no one seems to know whence it came." 16 The tersely-drafted statute,
unsupported by any records of congressional intent, lay dormant for
almost two centuries until, in 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit famously interpreted it as a potent weapon in international
human rights litigation.17 Since then, the ATS has frequently been
employed by foreign citizens seeking compensation in United States
courts for alleged human rights abuses in violation of customary inter-
national law, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the
location of the act.'8 In its 2004 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain opinion, the
Supreme Court treated the Second Circuit's judgment in Filartiga
favorably.19 There, the Court decided that the ATS itself creates no
cause of action, but was "enacted on the understanding that the com-
mon law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations ... based on the present-day law of nations
12 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
13 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350).
14 In ATS jurisprudence, U.S. courts have used the terms "customary international law"
and "law of nations" interchangeably. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116, n.3.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
16 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
17 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
1 Eg., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Estate of Marcos
Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1993); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995); Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp.2d
375 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla.
2008).
'9 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 731 32 (2004).
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... rest[ing] on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18t-century paradigms" of violations of safe conduct,
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.20 The courts,
therefore, have the authority to recognize norms "that already exist or
may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law," 21
provided that they meet the Sosa guidance.
Though only a small number of cases have been litigated, the
ATS has revolutionized the enforcement of international human rights
norms by providing individuals the standing to directly invoke
international law against former state officials or their aiders and
abettors.22 However, the ATS does not supersede the law of sovereign
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, which is why
claims are typically brought against individuals and not against
states.23 Although the Constitution of the United States requires
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in an ATS claim, 24 this can be
achieved by "tag jurisdiction" affected during the defendant's transi-
tory presence in the forum, or "minimum contacts" for a corporate
20 Id. at 724-25. The Paquete Habana, 75 U.S. 677 (1900). "International law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works or
jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat." Id (Gray,
J.); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Ger. v. Neth.) 169 I.C.J. 3, 73, 77
(Feb. 20) (noting that the International Court of Justice has required "a very
widespread and representative participation . . .carried out in such a way, as to be
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it" (opiniojuris), in order to establish a rule of customary international
law).
21 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995).
22 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) (stating that individuals have traditionally been
considered as objects, not subjects, of international law and do not have a right of
standing before international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice).
23 E.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)
(There, an ATS claim was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is the FSIA.).
24 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 13, 23.
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defendant, just as in non-ATS transnational civil litigation.25 ATS
claims against foreign corporations have become particularly contro-
versial, as they are seen by critics to be using "corporations as proxies
for what are essentially attacks on [foreign] government policy."26
The ATS is often described as an example of American legal
"exceptionalism" -particularly when contrasted with the United
States Government's refusal to join the International Criminal Court
and its mission to make international law for others while standing
apart from the rule-based system it created and advocates. 27 Critics
variously argue the following: the lower courts have disregarded the
limitations placed by the Supreme Court in Sosa on the type of
international law violations that can be recognized under the ATS;28
the extraterritorial effect of the ATS in foreign-cubed cases is contrary
to international law; 29 and the ATS does not apply universal human
rights norms at all but imposes American law masquerading as inter-
national law - "the law of the hegemon" - on non-consenting states.30
The ATS is also politically divisive. The George W. Bush administra-
tion sought to curtail the ATS's application to conduct abroad and to
corporations; the Obama administration originally acted as anicus to
25 E.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
26 Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS
102, 107 (Sept.-Oct. 2000) available at http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/56438/anne-marie-slaughter-and-david-bosco/plaintiffs-diplomacy# ("The
ever more litigious nature of American society is starting to affect an unexpected area:
foreign policy. Increasing numbers of individuals, both American and foreign, are now
using U.S. courts to defend their rights under international law in ways impossible just
a few years ago.").
27 Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 74, 76 (1990) ("From the beginning, the
international human rights movement was conceived by the United States as designed
to improve the conditions of human rights in countries other than the United States
(and a very few like-minded liberal states). . . . [The United States] did not strongly
favor but it also did not resist the move to develop international agreements and
international, but, again, it saw them as designed for other states.").
28 Supplemental Brief of Chevron Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Kiobel, v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-
1491).
2 9 1d. at 3.
30 Kenneth Anderson, The ATS, Incentives, and Tradeoffs (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://opinioj uris.org/2012/03/06/the-ats-incentives-and-tradeoffs/.
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the plaintiffs in Kiobel.31 However, as discussed infra, the United States
has dropped its support for the Kiobel plaintiffs in the latest round of
briefs submitted in response to the Court's extraterritoriality
question.32 ATS jurisdiction can be complementary to traditional
transnational litigation in federal and state courts.3 3 As the court noted
in Filartiga, federal courts frequently exercise jurisdiction over torts
committed in a foreign territory, subject to forum non conveniens34 and
conflict of laws principles.3 5 In many cases, however, the ATS provides
the only possible means for a plaintiff to bring suit in the United States.
3 'See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth From Reality About Corporate
Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 263, 271 (2004) (arguing that criticism of
ATS claims against corporate defendants rests on four myths: "that United States
courts cannot hold private corporations civilly liable for torts in violation of
international law; that there is a flood of such cases that would impose liability on
corporations simply for doing business in a difficult country; that statutory amendment
or doctrinal reversal is necessary to stem this flood of litigation; and that domestic
litigation is in any event a bad way to promote higher corporate standards"); Brief of
Amici Curiae BP America et al. in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 2010) (No. 06-4800) (comparing Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae in Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008)
with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2010)). U.S. courts are likely to defer to the
views of the Executive Branch regarding the content of international law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §1 12(c)
(1987).
32 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 2010)
(No. 06-4800).
3 In some instances where ATS claims have failed, plaintiffs have gone on to
successfully pursue a private tort claim in state courts applying normal conflicts rules.
See, e.g, Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.C. 2008).
34 The doctrine of forum non conveniens as applied by American courts requires a
court to balance both public and private factors (such as the location of witnesses and
evidence, the adequacy of alternative jurisdictions, the burden on the defendant, choice
of law, and public policy) in order to determine whether a claim should be dismissed to
an adequate alternative forum including the courts of a foreign sovereign, where such
an alternative forum exists. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6, 254
n.22 (1981).
3 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 ("Common law courts of general jurisdiction regularly
adjudicate transitory tort claims between individuals over whom they exercise personal
jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred.").
U. MIAMI INT'L &COMP. L. REV.
Recent developments in Sarei v. Rio Tinto36 and Kiobel cases
have catapulted the extraterritoriality issue to the fore, with the
Supreme Court poised to decide in the near future whether the ATS
can apply to acts committed in foreign countries. The often overlap-
ping and ideologically-charged political and legal debates have
become increasingly heated as a result of the recent proliferation of
class action claims against foreign corporations that are alleged to have
encouraged, assisted or participated in human rights violations com-
mitted by a foreign government on non-US territory.37 Concerns about
the universal scope of the ATS are also compounded by foreign states'
longstanding misgivings over the notoriously plaintiff-friendly nature
of civil litigation in the United States. As the English judge Lord
Denning once observed, litigants are drawn to the United States "as a
moth is to the light," as a result of various factors such as favorable
rules on costs, contingency fees, and discovery; the right to jury trial;
an opt-out class action system; and the availability of punitive
damages.3 8 The $4.5 billion jury verdict against the Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic is a particularly striking example of the fusion of
the ATS with the modern U.S. tort liability system.39 It is important to
note, however, that most judgments are never collected, and remain
moral victories only.40
It is the purpose of this essay to outline the unique history of
the ATS and ATS litigation, to examine whether the U.S. courts'
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in ATS cases is permissible under
both public international law and American law and, accordingly,
whether and in what circumstances the Supreme Court should uphold
the statute's extraterritorial application. The first part of this essay shall
proceed by introducing the landmark ATS cases relating to these
36 Sarei v. RioTinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
37 Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, as Amici Curiae
in Support of the Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621. F.3d 111
(2nd Cir. 2010) (No. 06-4800).
3 Smith Kline & French Lab Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All ER 72, 74; see also Amici
Brief of the United Kingdom et al., supra note 37, at 26.
39 David Rohde, Jury in New York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, NY TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2000, at A10.
40 Susan Simpson, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in Plaintiff Victories, THE VIEW




issues - Filartiga, Sosa, Sarei, and Kiobel - before turning, in the second
part, to a specific examination of the principle of universal jurisdiction
under international law and the presumption against extraterritoriality
under U.S. law. The final part of this essay will examine some of the
extraterritoriality arguments made in Sarei and Kiobel.
There are plausible legal arguments both for and against the
extraterritorial application of the ATS, and the outcome will
doubtless turn on U.S. canons of statutory interpretation rather than
international law per se. However, on balance, there are effective
mechanisms, such as the doctrine of forum non conveniens or the
customary international law rule requiring exhaustion of local
remedies, that could be employed to mitigate the political concerns
about universal civil liability without the need to revoke the
extraterritorial application of the ATS. This practice would ensure
that victims of the most heinous human rights abuses might continue
to seek compensation in U.S. courts when they would have no other
forum or would be unjustly denied justice in a foreign court having a
traditional jurisdictional connection.
II. MODERN APPLICATION OF THE ATS: THE LANDMARK CASES
A. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
The first modern ATS claim, Filartiga, was an extraterritorial
case between two non-resident aliens. The case concerned a claim by
citizens of the Republic of Paraguay against a Paraguayan former
police chief, Pena, for the torture and killing of their son and brother,
Joelito, in Paraguay.41 Upon learning that Pena had emigrated to the
U.S., Joelito's sister, who was also living in the U.S., served him with a
complaint alleging that, acting under color of his authority as a
Paraguayan official, he had caused her brother's death by torture. She
sought compensatory and punitive damages of $10,000,000.42 The
Filartiga's claimed jurisdiction under the general federal question
jurisdiction provision43 and the Alien Tort Statute.44 However the
41 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
42 Id. at 879.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (LexisNexis 1980).
44 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
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district judge dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
holding that the law of nations does not regulate a foreign state's
treatment of its own citizens.4 5 The district court thus did not consider
the defendant's alternative argument for dismissal on the grounds of
forum non conveniens.
The U.S. government supported the plaintiffs in appealing the
district court's decision and submitted an amicus memorandum
criticizing the outcome. The United States argued that the ATS had
evolved over time to reflect the developing concern of international
law with how a nation treats its own citizens.46 Moreover, the
prohibition against torture was one of "only a few rights hav[ing] the
degree of specificity and universality to permit private enforcement
. . . ."47 The United States continued:
This does not mean that [the ATS] appoints the United
States courts as Commissions to evaluate the human
rights performance of foreign nations. The courts are
properly confined to determining whether an indivi-
dual has suffered a denial of rights guaranteed him as
an individual by customary international law. Accor-
dingly, before entertaining a suit alleging a violation of
human rights, a court must first conclude that there is a
consensus in the international community that the
right is protected and that there is a widely shared
understanding of the scope of this protection. When
these conditions have been satisfied, there is little dan-
ger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign
policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a
private cause of action in these circumstances might
seriously damage the credibility of our nation's com-
mitment to the protection of human rights.... [O]fficial
torture is both clearly defined and universally con-
45 id
46 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra
note 22, at 4.
47 Id. at 6.
10 V. 20
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demned. Therefore, private enforcement is entirely
appropriate.48
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs principally
sought to base federal jurisdiction upon the ATS.49 The Court of
Appeals accordingly considered the threshold jurisdictional question
to be whether the alleged conduct violated the law of nations. Finding
that official torture was clearly and unambiguously prohibited,5 0 the
Court of Appeals concluded that "whenever an alleged torturer is
found and served with process by an alien within our borders, [the
ATS] provides federal jurisdiction."51 The court famously declared,
"the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before
him-hostis huniani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding
today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless
dream to free all people from brutal violence." 52 The court also held
that "it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as
granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts
for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international
law."53 Although the court did not directly address the issue, it
appears to have believed there would be no prescriptive jurisdiction
question, because by applying the law of nations, the court was not
applying U.S. law extraterritorially. 54
B. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The Supreme Court in Sosa favorably recognized the Second
Circuit's decision in Filartiga almost twenty-five years later.5 5 Plaintiff
Humberto Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez") was a Mexican national who
had been abducted in Mexico by a gang of Mexican nationals,
48 Id. at 22 23 (internal citations omitted).
49 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
'old. at 884.
5 Id. at 878.
52 Id. at 890.
" Id. at 887.
54 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S Lav, 2001 U. Chi. Legal F. 323,
342 n.88 (2001).
" Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
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including the defendant-petitioner.56 The kidnappers were acting on
the orders of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, which
wanted Alvarez delivered to the U.S. to face trial for the alleged torture
and murder of a DEA agent.57 The plan was developed after Alvarez
was indicted by a federal grand jury because Mexico had failed to
extradite him to the United States.58
The DEA believed that Alvarez, a physician, had acted to
prolong the DEA agent's life in order to extend the interrogation and
torture.59 Alvarez was abducted and held overnight in Mexico before
being brought by private plane to Texas where federal officers arrested
him.60 Following his acquittal, Alvarez sued Sosa and four other
Mexicans under the Alien Tort Statute, and four DEA agents and the
United States under the Federal Tort Claim Act.61
The Supreme Court held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
only "in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain
cases concerned with a certain subject,"62 and thus does not confer a
cause of action. However, the Court rejected Sosa's argument that the
ATS merely confers jurisdiction on the federal courts but does not
authorize them "to recognize any particular right of action without
further congressional action."63 The ATS was not passed "as a
jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future
Congress." 64 Rather, the Court held that the ATS "enabled federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of
nations and recognized at common law."65 The Supreme Court
rejected Alvarez's claim, holding that his detention of less than a day,
followed by his transfer to U.S. law enforcement authorities, did not
56 1d. at 698.
57 Id.
5
1 Id. at 697 98.
59 Id. at 697.
' 0 d. at 698.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
6 2
1d. at 714.
61 Id at 712.
6 4
1d. at 719.
65 Id. at 712. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that "the grant of federal-
question jurisdiction [under 28 U.S.C. section 1331] would be equally as good" as the
ATS, because only the ATS permits the judiciary to develop the federal common law
in the field of foreign relations. Id. at 731 n.19.
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violate a "norm of customary international law so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy." 66
The Court based this decision on an analysis of the historical
context of the ATS, finding that when the ATS was first enacted, the
law of nations was understood as comprising two principal elements. 67
First, there was the law pertaining to the rights and obligations
between states, which "occupied the executive and legislative
domains, not the judicial." 68 The second, "more pedestrian" element
essentially comprised the lex mercatoria and maritime law, the
transnational regulation of individuals engaging in international trade
and admiralty. This was a body of judge-made law, which therefore
was within the judicial sphere.69 Yet there was also a third sphere in
which these two principal elements of international law-the one
concerned with state diplomacy and the other with individually
enforceable rights -overlapped. The Court here relied on Blackstone's
reference in his Commentaries to three specific offenses against the law
of nations that were incorporated into English criminal law - violation
of safe conducts, infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy-and concluded, "[i]t was this narrow set of violations of the
law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time
threatening serious consequences in international affairs, that was
probably on the minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its
reference to tort."70
The Supreme Court found that there was good reason for the
First Congress to provide a judicial remedy in the federal courts for
such violations of the law of nations. Prior to the founding of the
Republic, the Continental Congress had been unable to "cause
infractions of treaties or of the law of nations [for which the United
States might be held accountable] to be punished."71 One infamous
66 Id at 738; see also William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort
Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 Rutgers L.J. 635, 646 (2006)
(suggesting that it is for the federal courts to determine whether a common law remedy
may be derived from customary international law).
6 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
6 1Id at 714.
6 9 Id. at 715.
70 id.
71 Id. at 715 (quoting JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed., 1893)).
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example was the "Marbois incident" of 1784, when the Secretary of the
French Legion was verbally and physically assaulted in Philadelphia
by another Frenchman.72 A second such incident occurred in 1787,
when a New York City constable entered the residence of a Dutch
diplomat with an arrest warrant for one of his servants.7 3 Concerns
persisted that the states were failing to provide remedies for the
adequate vindication of the law of nations, yet the national govern-
ment was powerless to act.74 The Framers therefore responded by
expressly including cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls" under the U.S. Constitution's Article III grant
of federal jurisdiction.7 5 This was followed by the First Congress's
passing of the Judiciary Act, which included the ATS, and granted
federal jurisdiction over suits brought by diplomats. 76
The Court therefore concluded that the First Congress
intended the ATS to afford to aliens a federal forum for the "relatively
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations" at the
time.7 7 The Court found no evidence to suggest that the First Congress
envisaged causes of action for violations of the law of nations beyond
Blackstone's three criminal offenses.78 But neither did the Court find
any evidence of developments since then restricting the federal courts
from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as a claim of
common law.79 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that federal courts'
discretion to recognize new common law causes of action for violations
of the law of nations should be tightly circumscribed: "[Courts should
7 2 Id. at 716-17.
7 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717; Sarei v Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 801 (9th Cir. 2011).
74 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717. It is interesting to note that, contrary to the contemporary
perception of the United States as having always been a unilateralist or isolationist
power that pays little regard to international law, contemporary research into the legal
history of the United States Constitution and international law suggests that the
Framers were in fact guided by a profound sense of the political and moral importance
of formal international recognition and compliance with the law of nations to the future
viability and success of the Republic. See David M. Golove and Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Lav of Nations, and the
Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U.L. REV. 932, 934--35 (2010).
75 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717.
76 Id
7 7 1d at 720.
78 Id. at 724.
79 1d at 724-25.
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require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized."80
The Supreme Court cited five reasons for this judicial caution
and restraint. First, the prevailing conception of the common law has
changed since 1789. Today, "there is a general understanding that the
law is not so much found or discovered as it is either made or
created;" 81 this legal realist suspicion of judicial power is particularly
acute when it comes to international norms which evolve over time
and by their nature can be highly contested and uncertain. Second,
after the Court's decision in Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 82 there is no general
federal common law that federal courts have the authority to derive;
even in regards to the specialized body of federal common law relating
to foreign relations that continues to exist post-Erie, federal courts
should "look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative
authority over substantive law."83 Third, in the great majority of cases,
it is the legislature rather than the judiciary that should create private
rights of action.84 Fourth, the principle of separation of powers requires
courts to be particularly wary of recognizing new private causes of
actions that might infringe on the discretion of the legislative and
executive branches in the conduct of foreign relations.8 5 This is of
particular concern because contemporary international human rights
law imposes limits on a state's power over its own citizens, and ATS
claims may accordingly seek to impugn the conduct of a foreign
state. 86 Fifth, federal courts "have no congressional mandate to seek
out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations."87
The Supreme Court highlighted that Congress has taken no action to
promote such suits, and that the Senate has "expressly declined to give
80 Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 26, 729 ("[W]e now tend to understand the common law not
as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product
of human choice.").
82 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8' Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
84 Id. at 727.
85id.
86 id
87 Id. at 728.
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the federal courts the task of interpreting and applying international
human rights law."88 This is evidenced, for example, by the U.S.
Senate's declaration that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is not self-executing and therefore not directly
enforceable by individuals in U.S. courts.89
Contrary to Justice Scalia's concurrence, the majority did not
consider that these developments should operate to prevent "further
independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms." 90
Instead, "the judicial power should be exercised on the understanding
that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant door keeping, and thus open
to a narrow class of international norms today." 91 Recognizing that
customary international law has been part of the domestic law of the
United States since the country's founding, the Court stated that:
It would take some explaining to say now that federal
courts must avert their gaze entirely from any interna-
tional norm intended to protect individuals ... We think
it would be unreasonable to assume that the First
Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all
capacity to recognize enforceable international norms
simply because the common law might lose some meta-
physical cachet on the road to modern realism.92
The question of extraterritorial application of the ATS was
briefed and argued,93 but was ultimately not relied upon by the
Supreme Court in its opinion. In his concurrence, however, Justice
Breyer questioned whether the expansive scope of jurisdiction under
the ATS is consistent with the notions of international comity that
requires states to limit the reach of its laws and their enforcement out
of respect for the sovereignty of other nations.94 "Such consideration is
8' Id. at 728.
89 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
90 Id. at 729.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 730.
9 Petitioner's Supplemental Opening Brief at 12, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2010) (No. 10-1491).
9 4 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761.
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necessary to ensure that ATS litigation does not undermine the very
harmony that it was intended to promote."9 5 Nonetheless, Justice
Breyer observed that there is a "procedural consensus" that:
suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in
respect to a limited set of norms is consistent with prin-
ciples of international comity. That is, allowing every
nation's courts to adjudicate foreign conduct involving
foreign parties in such cases will not significantly
threaten the practical harmony that comity principles
seek to protect. That consensus concerns criminal juris-
diction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdic-
tion itself suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would
be no more threatening. 96
Regarding extraterritoriality, it is interesting to note that Justice
Souter's opinion of the Court refers to the 1795 opinion of Attorney
General William Bradford as support for the inference that the ATS
conferred jurisdiction over a narrow set of common law actions
derived from customary international law.97 Although the Court does
not discuss that opinion in the context of extraterritorial application of
the ATS, Attorney General Bradford supported civil tort actions being
brought in the U.S. by aliens against Americans who had taken part in
the French plunder of a British slave colony in Sierra Leone.98 Seven
years after the ATS became law, "there can be no doubt," Bradford
wrote, that "the company or individuals who have been injured by
these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the
United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all
cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the law of
nations...."99 Accordingly, leading advocates of the extraterritorial
application of the ATS have sought to rely on the 1795 opinion as clear
precedent "supporting the use of US courts for Filartiga-type recovery"
9 5 id.
96 Id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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under the ATS.100 At the very least, Bradford's opinion supports the
proposition that the ATS applies extraterritorially where there are
sufficient connections with the United States, such as the nationality of
the defendant. In its latest brief in Kiobel, however, the United States
Government "acknowledges that the opinion is amenable to different
interpretations" and does not necessarily support the extension of the
ATS to foreign-cubed cases. 101
The European Commission filed an amicus brief in the Sosa
case to express its concern over the extraterritorial application of the
ATS and to urge the Supreme Court to construe the statute consistently
within the limits the Commission understood as being imposed by
international law on a state's jurisdiction.102 The Commission argued
that the ATS should be interpreted in accord with the Charming Betsy
principle that "an act of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains."103 The European Commission did not consider the existence
and scope of universal civil jurisdiction to be well established; thus, the
ATS should be strictly interpreted so as to apply to "conduct with no
nexus to the United States only where that exercise accords with
principles governing universal [criminal] jurisdiction."104 The ATS
should therefore apply only to human rights violations over which
international law recognizes universal criminal jurisdiction- such as
torture, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity-and
should be exercised only when the claimant would otherwise be
subject to a denial of justice.1 05 Indeed, this is the position that Justice
Breyer appears to have taken in his separate concurring opinion.106
100 Koh, supra note 31, at 271.
101 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 8 n.1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010) (No.
10-1491) 2012 WL 2161290.
102 Brief of Amicus Curiae in the European Commission in Support of Neither Party at
2 3, 12, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339) 2004 WL
177036 (citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804)).
103 Id at 3.
104 1d at 26 27.
105 Id at 16, 26-27.
106 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760-63 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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The Australian, Swiss and British governments were similarly
insistent in their amici brief that "[a]bsent the recognition of universal
jurisdiction for a particular matter (e.g., piracy), there is no basis in
international law for the creation of an explicit U.S. civil cause of action
involving disputes among aliens, wherever domiciled, based on
foreign activities that have no effects within the United States."107
C. The Kiobel Case and the Liability of Corporations under the
ATS
The 1995 decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Kadic v. Karadzic08 opened the door to a second generation of ATS
claims brought not against individuals, but against multinational
corporations for aiding and abetting human rights violations abroad.
Kadic concerned an ATS claim against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic for rape, torture, and summary executions committed with
genocidal intent by his forces in the war against the newly indepen-
dent Bosnia and Herzegovina.109 The district court dismissed the suit
because Karadzic did not qualify as a state actor.110 The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that non-state actors may be liable for
violations of international law that require state action, and that
Karadzic could in any event be liable for crimes such as torture -
which must be committed by state officials or under color of law to
amount to a crime under international law -because he had acted in
concert with the former Yugoslavia, the statehood of which was not
disputed.111 By recognizing that a private actor could be liable under
the ATS by acting in concert with a state actor or with significant state
support, the Court of Appeals allowed claims against corporations for
aiding and abetting to proceed.112
107 Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss
Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 7, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004), 2004 U.S.S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 910.
108 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
'09 Id at 236 37.
110 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
" Id at 244-45.
112 Louis HENKIN, SARAH CLEVELAND ET AL. (EDS.), HUMAN RIGHTS 1113-1114 (2d
ed., 2009).
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D. The Circuit Split and Kiobel
A divisive split between the circuits has since emerged on the
question of corporate liability under the ATS. In July 2011, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Doe v. ExxonMobil
Corp.113 and the Seventh Circuit in Flonio v. Firestone Natural Rubber
Co. 114 rejected the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel that corporations
are not liable for violations of customary international law. In October
2011, the Ninth Circuit did the same in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC. 115 The
division between the Second Circuit and the other circuits led the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in October 2011 in the Kiobel case on
the question of whether corporations are immune from tort liability
under the ATS.116
The Kiobel plaintiffs are Nigerian residents who in 2002 filed a
putative class action suit under the ATS,117 alleging that Dutch, British,
and Nigerian oil exploration and production companies aided and
abetted the Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses
including torture; rape; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;
arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against humanity; property
destruction; forced exile; extrajudicial killings; and violations of the
rights to life, liberty, security, and association.118 The Second Circuit
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
majority determined that "no corporation has ever been subject to any
form of liability under the customary international law of human
rights" and that corporate liability "has not attained a discernible,
much less universal, acceptance among nations of the world in their
relations inter se." 119 Agreeing that the plaintiffs could not support their
aiding and abetting claim, Judge Leval concurred in the judgment
dismissing the complaint. However, he was dismayed that, according
113 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
114 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
115 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
116 Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Suing Corporations and PLO (UPDATED),
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 10:18 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/
10/court-to-rule-on-suing-corporations/.
117 All of the plaintiffs had received political asylum in the United States by the time
the case was filed. Petitioners' Supplemental Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 1.
118 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
' Id at 121, 145.
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to the decision of the majority, "one who earns profits by commercial
exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can successfully
shield those profits from victims' claims for compensation simply by
taking the precaution of conducting the heinous operation in the
corporate form." 120 Judge Leval argued that no precedent of interna-
tional law supports the distinction between natural persons and cor-
porations.121 Rather, "the position of international law on whether civil
liability should be imposed for violations of its norms is that inter-
national law takes no position and leaves that question to each nation
to resolve."122
E. Extraterritoriality in the Kiobel Case: The Sarei Connection
The unexpected sidelining of the corporate liability issue by the
Supreme Court in Kiobel is the result of the tactical machinations of the
plaintiffs in another case, Sarei v. Rio Tinto.123 The Ninth Circuit's Octo-
ber 2011 decision in Sarei sided with Judge Leval's concurrence in
Kiobel and affirmed that corporations can be held liable under the
ATS. 124 This was the second en banc opinion of the Ninth Circuit in the
long-running Sarei case, which alleged that Rio Tinto played a role in
racial discrimination, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide committed against residents of Bougainville, Papua New
Guinea. 125 In addition to the corporate liability issue, the court's latest
opinion raises a number of other controversial issues concerning the
ATS, including extraterritoriality. 126
120 Id at 149-50 (Leval, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 151 (Leval, J., concurring).
122 Id at 152 (Leval, J. concurring).
123 Sarei, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
124 Id at 747.
125 Id at 743.
126 Id at 744. The court also considered the following: whether claims of aiding and
abetting liability fall outside the scope of international law; whether the federal courts
have jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution to adjudicate alien versus alien
claims; the need for an exhaustion of local remedies requirement; and the role of
political question, international comity and Act of State doctrines in ATS litigation. Id
at 748, 749, 754.
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Significantly, the Sarei court held that the ATS does not violate
the presumption against the extraterritoriality of U.S. statutes.127
Referring to the Supreme Court's finding in Sosa that piracy was one of
the paradigmatic cases that the First Congress had in mind when
enacting the ATS, the court found that this was one of several "clear
indications" of the ATS's extraterritorial applicability.128 Other indica-
tions included the fact that the statute creates jurisdiction for claims
brought by aliens and that the law to be applied is the law of
nations.129 The court noted that there was no suggestion anywhere that
the presumption against extraterritoriality existed when the ATS was
enacted in 1789.130
The Ninth Circuit also based its reasoning on the distinction
between the ATS, which is a jurisdictional statute, and the claims made
under it, which are "international [norms] ... derived from interna-
tional law."131 The traditional concerns underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality - conflict with the sovereign prerogatives of a
foreign state-do not apply because "the ATS provides a domestic
forum for claims based on conduct that is illegal everywhere, including
the place where that conduct took place." 132
In November 2011, Rio Tinto petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari asking whether the ATS can apply extraterritorially.
Accordingly, it is Sarei, not Kiobel, which presented extraterritoriality as
its central issue. However, " [i]n a fascinating tactical maneuver," the
Sarei plaintiffs waived their right to respond to Rio Tinto's petition.133
The Court inevitably ordered the plaintiffs to respond, but the
resulting delay would have prevented the Court from hearing the case
before the end of the term.134
127 Id at 745-747
128 Id at 745.
129 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 746.
30 Id at 745.
'Id at 746.
132 id
133 Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lavyer: Human Rights Plaintiffs Can't Even






The Supreme Court therefore chose Kiobel to be the case to
address extraterritoriality. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum and its amici
had already raised the extraterritoriality issue in their Kiobel briefs,
arguing that the ATS should not be construed to apply to conduct
within a foreign nation's borders.13 5 At the hearing on February 28,
2012, Justices Kennedy and Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts pursued
this line of argument. Observing that Kiobel involves Nigerian plaintiffs
alleging violations of international law in Nigeria, Justice Alito asked,
"What business does a case like that have in the courts of the United
States?" 136 On March 5, 2012, the Court decided to take no further
action in Sarei, instead issuing the surprise procedural order directing
new briefing and argument in Kiobel on a question that was not even
presented to the Court: "Whether and under what circumstances the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S. sec. 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause
of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States." 37
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNIVERSAL CIVIL JURISDICTION,
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE ATS
In order to understand the basis for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in ATS transnational civil litigation, it is necessary to
appreciate its origins in international criminal law. Universal
jurisdiction concerns the restrictions placed by international law on the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of a sovereign state's courts, but it is also
closely interlinked with those substantive international law offenses
applicable to individuals. Although public international law has
traditionally been defined as the law governing the relations between
states alone, 138 in practice, customary international law - historically
known as the "law of nations"-has for centuries recognized legal
rights and obligations relating to individuals, as the Supreme Court
135 Brief for the Respondents § III.B., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111
(2d Cir. 2010) (No.10-1491), 2012 WL 259389.
136 Oral Argument at 10:02 AM, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/ 10-1491.pdf.
137 Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. at 1738.
8
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27 29 (1973).
2012 23
U. MIAMI INT'L &COMP. L. REv.
acknowledged in Sosa.139 International law not only encompasses the
principle of state responsibility, which invokes liability at the govern-
mental level for breaches of international law attributable to the state,
but also that of individual responsibility for conduct labeled as criminal
and attributable to an individual under international law. 140 Indeed,
the right of states to directly prosecute individuals for crimes against
international law has a long pedigree,141 and is closely linked to the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the courts of sovereign states.
The principle of universal jurisdiction emerged in the sixteenth century
as a corollary to the development of the substantive international law
crime of piracy, which in the absence of an international criminal
tribunal could only be prosecuted by sovereign states in their domestic
courts. 142 "[A] person guilty of piracy has placed himself beyond the
protection of any State. He is no longer a national," 143 but is considered
by international law to be hostis huniani generis -an enemy of man-
kind -of whom all states have an interest in prosecuting, regardless of
whether the act of piracy was committed by a national of that state or
within its territorial waters or against one of its vessels.144
The contemporary interest in universal jurisdiction in both
criminal and civil proceedings reflects the radical change in the subject
matter of international law since 1945. The primary concern used to be
inter-state relations, but since World War II the focus has shifted to
certain "universal" norms and the protection of individuals from
human rights abuses inflicted by their own governments. 145 Accor-
dingly, the principle of universal jurisdiction is now utilized or
h9 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714; see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 66 (1769) ("The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural
reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the
world; in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to
ensure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which must
frequently occur between two or more states, and the individuals belonging to each.")
(emphasis added).
140 INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 456 (Lori F. Damrosch, Louis
Henkin, Sean D. Murphy, & Hans Smit (eds., 5th ed., 2009)).
141id
142 In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] AC 586, 589 (Privy Council).
143id
144 Damrosch, supra note 140, at 456.
145 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 154 (Leval, J., concurring).
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advocated as a tool in the "fight against impunity."146 It has taken on a
radical role in international relations, seeking to privilege the demands
for individual justice over the classical international law principles of
sovereign immunity and non-interference.
A. Universal Jurisdiction and International Law Today: Balancing
Sovereignty and Justice
In an international system predicated on the principles of the
sovereign equality of states and non-interference by one state in the
internal affairs of another, there is a clear need to prevent conflicts
arising from one state prescribing laws for persons situated in the
territory of another state.147 Accordingly, international law does not
permit a state to apply its own laws extraterritorially to conduct
occurring in a foreign state unless it is justified in accordance with one
of the accepted principles governing prescriptive jurisdiction, which is
"the authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons or
activities."148
Traditionally, international law has required there to be a clear
connecting factor, or nexus, between the legislating state and the
conduct that it seeks to regulate.149 Hence, the most firmly established
principles of prescriptive jurisdiction in international law are territori-
ality, which recognizes the right of a state to prescribe laws that apply
within its territory, and nationality, under which a state may apply its
laws to its citizens wherever they may be.150 Under the protective
principle, a state may also exercise prescriptive jurisdiction to protect its
national or security interests.' 5' Some states also claim the right to
146 The "fight against impunity" is a central goal of the United Nations system of
international criminal justice. See, e.g., "Strengthen fight against impunity through
ICC, Ban tells States parties", UN NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 6, 2010), http:/
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36971&Cr international.
147 Lowe & Staker, supra note 7, at 319.
148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 231
(1987); see also Lowe & Staker, supra note 7, at 313 (Explaining that, under public
international law, the term "jurisdiction" is used to describe "the limits of the legal
competence of a State ... to make, apply, and enforce rules of conduct upon persons.").
149 Lowe & Staker, supra note 7, at 320.
15 Id. at 320-23.
'. Id at 325 26.
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regulate foreign conduct that harms its nationals under the passive
personality principle.152 The United States has adopted a broader notion
of territorial jurisdiction that accords U.S. courts jurisdiction to
prescribe law "with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or
is intended to have substantial effects within its territory."15 3
Universal jurisdiction is the only legal basis under interna-
tional law for a state to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over acts with
no connection to it by territory, nationality or need for protection.154
The scope of the principle remains unsettled and its application is
controversial in both criminal and civil proceedings. The revival of the
Alien Tort Statute in the United States has made this particularly true
in the realm of civil litigation.
As briefly stated above, in the absence of an international
criminal court, the principle of universal jurisdiction arose out of
efforts to combat the impunity of individuals who committed crimes
proscribed by international law, such as piracy and slave trading.155
The motive for the exercise of universal jurisdiction was originally a
practical one, for pirates and slave traders were often able to avoid the
ordinary territorial or national jurisdiction of states.156 In the post-
World War II era, however, it is now the heinousness of an offense that
determines the permissibility of the exercise of universal jurisdiction.157
The prosecution of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg after the Second World
War built on the piracy precedent in holding individuals responsible
for conduct labeled as criminal under international law, including war
crimes and crimes against humanity, which reaffirmed that individuals
152 Id at 330.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(c) (1987); Lowe & Staker, supra note 7, at 322.
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987) (asserting that a state has universal jurisdiction to define and punish certain
offenses "recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as
piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and
perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases ofjurisdiction indicated
in § 402 [territoriality, nationality, protection of state interests] is present.").
155 Damrosch, supra note 140, at 804-815.
56 Lowe & Staker, supra note 7, at 326 27; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 comment a. (1987).
15 Lowe & Staker, supra note 7, at 327.
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are subjects, not merely objects, of international law.158 In a parallel
development, states have cautiously come to recognize that certain
international crimes, such as torture or genocide, are so heinous that
they affect the international order as a whole and should be considered
as an "offence against the law of nations." 59 The prohibition of these
crimes is said by international law to have the character of a jus cogens,
or peremptory norm.160 Such claims involve the violation of obliga-
tions under international law that the International Court of Justice has
described as being owed erga omnes,161 or to everyone. The repression
of these crimes is therefore in the interest of the entire international
community; hence, any state is arguably permitted by international
law to prosecute them, regardless of whether the offense occurred
within its territorial jurisdiction or was committed by or against one of
its nationals.162 Universal jurisdiction can attach to these crimes either
on the basis of a treaty, such as the Geneva Conventions or the Con-
vention Against Torture, or under customary international law.163
As Second Circuit Judge Leval explained in Kiobel, the Nurem-
berg Trials and the U.N. Charter marked the beginning of international
law's contemporary focus on universally shared moral objectives and
58 Damrosch, supra note 140, at 456. See also Harold Hongu Koh, Transnational
Public Law Litigation 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2358 (1991) (describing the 1946 war
crimes trials as the origin of "transnational public law litigation").
159 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, 39; see also, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,
776 F2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985) (U.S. applied the principle of universal
jurisdiction in granting the extradition of Demjanjuk to Israel for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in Poland during the war.).
160 Jus cogens norms are "accepted and recognised by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. "The full content of the category ofjus cogens remains to be worked out
in the practice of states and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 8 (Jennings and Watts eds., 9 th ed. 1992); R v.
Bartle, Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate & Commissioner of Police, ex parte
Pinochet, 2. W.L.R. 827, 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999) per Lord Browne- Wilkinson.
161 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
33-34 (Feb. 5, 1970) (referring to the prohibition of international crimes such as
genocide or slavery as generating "obligations ergaomnes" which, "[i]n view of the
importance of the rights involved," all states have a legal interest in protecting).
162 Lowe & Staker, supra note 7, at 326.
163 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, 22-41.
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the protection of individuals from human rights abuses by their own
governments. 164 The classical law of nations had never concerned itself
with the internal affairs of states; rather, "cloaked by an iron curtain of
sovereignty," how a state treated its own people was its own busi-
ness.165 Yet moral outrage over the Holocaust rendered this absolutist
position indefensible. "Since 1945, how a state treats its own citizens,
how it behaves even in its own territory, has no longer been its own
business; it has become a matter of international concern, of interna-
tional politics, and of international law." 66 The calls for an end to
impunity for perpetrators of the gravest human rights abuses reflect
the growing influence of international norms dedicated to the protec-
tion of the individual from both state and non-state actors. However,
there remains a need to be realistic about the prospects for compliance
with international human rights standards when sovereignty often still
functions as an iron curtain, where the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court remains highly circumscribed, and when potential
Security Council-authorized intervention in an attempt to end human
rights abuses is often frustrated by calculations of realpolitik. Even in an
era of humanitarian intervention and the idea of the "responsibility to
protect," state sovereignty continues to be justified on the grounds
that, in a world where power is distributed unevenly between states, it
preserves order by preventing acts of aggression and interference.167
Nevertheless, states have occasionally been successful in
invoking universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute foreigners for
violations of international criminal law committed abroad. Famous
examples of criminal prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction
include Israel's trial of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in
1962168 and the Pinochet case decided by the House of Lords in 1999.169
Further, in Denijanjuk v. Petrovsky, the U.S. courts recognized the exer-
164 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 154 (Leval, J., concurring).
165 Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights,
Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1999).
166 id
167 Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights,
Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1999).
168 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 298-304 (Sup. Ct. Israel
1962).
169 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R. 97.
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cise of universal criminal jurisdiction.170 Building on universal criminal
jurisdiction precedents, human rights lawyers have sought account-
ability for human rights abuses through transnational civil litigation,
often when traditional diplomatic channels have failed to deliver
justice to victims. 171
Some states consider this radical new aim of universal
jurisdiction to be a threat to orderly international relations. Indeed, the
International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case has held that
the principle cannot trump the immunity of an incumbent foreign
minister.172 Comments of national delegations at the United Nations
General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal) about the scope and
application of universal jurisdiction demonstrate that there is still little
consensus within the international community about the crimes the
principle applies to.173 There exists general concern over universal
jurisdiction's legal, political, and diplomatic consequences. 174 In the
opinion of the British government, "universal jurisdiction in its true
sense is only clearly established for a small number of specific crimes:
piracy and war crimes, including grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions." 175
The International Court of Justice has indirectly examined the
principle of universal jurisdiction in the context of sovereign immu-
nity. In the Arrest Warrant case, Belgium asserted universal jurisdiction
in issuing a warrant for the arrest of the sitting Congolese Foreign
Minister related to alleged offenses committed outside of Belgium
territorial jurisdiction against non-Belgian victims.176 Looking to
various sources of international law, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal noted the authorization of universal jurisdiction in the
170 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
171 Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 26.
172 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, T 59.
173 General Assembly of the United Nations Legal - Sixth Committee, The scope and
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction (Agenda item 84),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/ScopeAppUniJuri.shtml.
174 id
1 UK Mission to the UN, Scope and application of the principle of universal
jurisdiction, (April 15, 2011), http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/ScopeApp
UniJuri StatesComments/UK&Northern% 201reland.pdf.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121
(Feb. 14, 2002)
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Geneva Conventions and Convention Against Torture.177 The most
high-profile example of state practice involving the exercise of univer-
sal jurisdiction was the Pinochet case in the English House of Lords.
The jurisdictional basis in that instance was the Convention Against
Torture, which requires a state to extradite or prosecute any individual
found within its territory who is accused of torture anywhere in the
world,178 and so there was an obligation rather than a right to exercise
universal jurisdiction.179 Germany has also prosecuted genocide under
the principle of universal jurisdiction.18 0
With regards to customary international law, Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, Buergenthal found that there was no established general
practice of states exercising universal jurisdiction. 181 But neither did
they find evidence of an opinio juris on the illegality of universal
jurisdiction.182 These three judges did, however, identify "striking"
contemporary trends towards bases of jurisdiction other than terri-
toriality, including "effects" jurisdiction and passive personality juris-
diction, as well as the ATS itself.183 They also considered the famous
dictum in the Lotus case that, in the absence of an international law rule
to the contrary, states may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over acts
that take place abroad. 184 Noting that "the dictum represents the high
water mark of laissez-faire in international relations," the judges
nevertheless agreed that:
While no general rule of positive international law can
as yet be asserted which gives to states the right to
punish foreign nations for crimes against humanity in
the same way as they are, for instance, entitled to
punish acts of piracy, there are clear indications
77 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, 27-29, 38.
Id. 22; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, Article 5(2) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
179 Id 44.
8 0 Id 24.




184 The S.S. Lotus Case P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10 at 4 (1927).
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pointing to the gradual evolution of a significant
principle of international law to that effect.185
The joint separate opinion also provided guidelines on the
proper exercise of universal jurisdiction. For example, "universal
criminal jurisdiction [should] be exercised only over those crimes
regarded as the most heinous by the international community." 186
Further, a state with an ordinary basis of jurisdiction should be given
the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to act upon the
charges itself.187
B. Universal Jurisdiction in Civil Litigation
Does the exercise of universal jurisdiction over civil cases
fundamentally differ from that of criminal prosecutions? Bradley
suggests that civil remedies are "conceptually outside of the universal
jurisdiction authority;" instead, the theory of universal jurisdiction is
crime-based. 188 Donovan and Roberts, however, have suggested that
there is an emerging acceptance of universal civil jurisdiction. 189 They
argue that universal jurisdiction should be viewed holistically, not as
separate principles of universal criminal jurisdiction on the one hand
and universal civil jurisdiction on the other. Rather, universal juris-
diction over civil claims is best understood as a civil dimension to the
universal jurisdiction to impose criminal penalties.190 Donovan and
Roberts point to the obligation to make reparations under the interna-
tional law of state responsibility, or the payment of compensation as an
effective remedy to human rights violations or as an adjunct to
international criminal law.191 Furthermore, they argue that "[t]he goals
Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, 51-52 (citing OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 998 (Jennings and Watts eds., 9T ed. 1992)).
Id. 60.
Id. 59.
88 Bradley, supra note 54, at 346-47.
189 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 142.
190 Id. at 153.
1 Id; see also Rome Statute, art. 75, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (conferring ICC
power to "make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation.").
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of criminal and tort law overlap" in that punishment and compensa-
tion both serve to condemn past, and deter future, wrongdoing. 192
There is an unquestionable virtue in permitting the exercise of
universal civil jurisdiction to afford remedies to those who have
suffered the most heinous abuses of their fundamental rights and who
are likely to be deprived of an effective remedy in the place where the
offense was committed. However, international law is compelled to
seek a balance between order and justice among nations.193 The
question is where that balance should be struck, which is not the same
as asking what the status quo has been. There are several significant
factors that mitigate against the unbridled exercise of universal juris-
diction, including respect for international comity. Universal jurisdic-
tion over private suits is a particularly vexing issue, because it gives
rise to the risk of multiple proceedings and entails reduced state
control over the litigation; criminal cases involve prosecutorial
discretion by public authorities which can account for broader public
policy considerations, such as the impact on foreign relations, whereas
private claims do not.194 Even in civil cases, however, the courts can
provide a voice for these public interests through legal and procedural
doctrines such as personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, sovereign
immunity, act of state and political question. These doctrines empower
the courts to block inappropriate cases or remove them from the
forum.195 Nevertheless, critics of universal civil jurisdiction, such as
Bradley, suggest that the courts cannot be expected to accurately assess
the competing foreign policy interests, a function more appropriately
addressed by the executive and legislative branches of government. 196
English courts have had occasion to consider universal civil
jurisdiction in the context of transnational human rights litigation. In
the conjoined appeals to the House of Lords in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, the
English claimants sought damages from the Ministry of the Interior of
Saudi Arabia and blamed Saudi officials for systematic torture suffered
192 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 154.
193 See generally Hedley Bull, Order vs. Justice in International Society, POL. STUDIES
19(3) 269-83(1971).
194 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 155.
195 Id. at 155-56.
196 Bradley, supra note 54, at 347.
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by the claimants while imprisoned in Saudi Arabia.197 This was not a
case involving the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction but was
instead an ordinary tort claim implicating private international law by
virtue of the location of the defendants. 198 The claimants were British
nationals; though the act occurred outside of England's jurisdiction,
conflict of laws rules permitted the court to authorize service on the
defendants in Saudi Arabia on the grounds that the claim was for
tortious damages sustained within England. 199 The Court of Appeal
had allowed the claims against the individual Saudi officials but found
the claim against the state to be barred by the law on sovereign
immunity. 200 The appeal turned on sovereign immunity, which the
House of Lords ultimately held to protect all the defendants from suit.
The House of Lords went further in distinguishing the exercise of
universal criminal jurisdiction over Pinochet, for which the authority
was derived from the Convention Against Torture, and the exercise of
universal jurisdiction in civil proceedings, which the court held was
not supported under international law. 201
The House of Lords based its reasoning in part on the
Convention Against Torture's distinction between criminal and civil
remedies. Convention Articles 5 and 8 demonstrate the exercise of
universal criminal jurisdiction by requiring a state party to extradite or
prosecute an individual accused of torture found within its territory.202
Article 14 provides that a state shall provide compensation to victims
of torture. The Law Lords found that this provision on civil liability
does not apply extraterritorially. Lord Bingham referred to the U.S.
declaration under the Convention that "article 14 requires a State Party
to provide a private right of action for damages only for acts of torture
committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State Party."203 Lord
Bingham was likewise categorical in his overall survey of international
law, stating that "there is no evidence that states have recognised or
given effect to an international law obligation to exercise universal
197 Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 at 1.
198 Id at 2.
199Id
200 Id at 29.
2 0 1 Id at 29 34.
202 Id at 46; Convention Against Torture, supra note 178.
203 Convention Against Torture, supra note 178, 20 (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction over claims arising from alleged breaches of peremptory
norms of international law, nor is there any consensus of judicial or
learned opinion that they should."204 Lord Bingham concluded that:
It is, I think, hard to resist the suggestion.. .that the
Court of Appeal's decision represented a 'unilateral
assumption of jurisdiction by one national legal sys-
tem'. The court asserted what was in effective universal
tort jurisdiction in cases of official torture, for which
there was no adequate foundation in any international
convention, state practice or scholarly consensus, and
apparently by reference to a consideration (the absence
of a remedy in the foreign state . . .) which is, I think,
novel. Despite the sympathy one must of course feel for
the claimants if their complaints are true, international
law, representing the law binding on other nations and
not just our own, cannot be established in this way.205
C. Universal Civil Jurisdiction under the ATS
The leading example of a law conferring universal jurisdiction
in civil litigation is the Alien Tort Statute in the United States. The U.S.
Congress endorsed the Filartiga interpretation of the ATS when it
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), legislation that
implements the Convention Against Torture but was also designed to
address the uncertainty following the Filartiga decision as to whether
the ATS created a federal cause of action in respect of torture.206
Congress has gone further than any other national legislature in
authorizing the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction over torture by
permitting TVPA claims without a citizenship or territorial connection
2 0 4 Id 27.
205 Id 34.
206 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992);
H.R. REP. No. 102-367 pt. 1, at 3; Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark, The
Alien Tort Statute and the Law ofNations, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 445, 461 (2011).
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to the United States.207 The universal civil jurisdiction conferred on
U.S. courts by the ATS and TVPA to date has set the United States
apart from the rest of the world.
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court in Sosa upheld the
jurisdictional grant of the ATS, albeit taking a restrictive approach to
the recognition under federal common law of "a tort...in violation of
the law of nations."208 Under Sosa, plaintiffs face a two-stage require-
ment of showing that the alleged act violates a norm of international
law and that the norm is of sufficient specificity and universality to be
cognizable under federal common law.209 As noted above, however,
the Court did not directly address the question of the permissibility of
extraterritorial application of the ATS under U.S. or international law.
The few lower courts that have recognized that they are exercising
universal jurisdiction have relied on the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which without citing authority
states, "[i]n general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal interests has
been exercised in the form of criminal law, but international law does
not preclude the application of non-criminal law on this basis, for
example, by providing a remedy in tort or restitution for victims of
piracy." 210
The United States has been subjected to heavy criticism from
other states concerning the exercise of universal jurisdiction in many of
the ATS cases. In the UK case Jones v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Lord
Hoffmann suggested that the ATS is contrary to customary interna-
tional law and refuted U.S. Supreme Court Justice Breyer's "specula-
tion" in Sosa that international criminal jurisdiction over certain
criminal offenses by state officials may eventually lead to the accep-
tance of universal tort jurisdiction in international law.211 "It is not for a
national court to 'develop' international law by unilaterally adopting a
207 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 148-49. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second
Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that the TVPA had limited the claims that could
be brought under the ATS. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
208 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 30.
209 Id at 724-25.
210 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TH-E FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 cmt. b (1987) (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995);
Presbyterian Church v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997)).
211 Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 99.
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version of that law which, however desirable, forward-looking and
reflective of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other states,"
Lord Hoffmann stated.212 In the International Court of Justice Arrest
Warrant Case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal observed:
In civil matters we already see the beginnings of a very
broad form of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, the United States, basing itself
on a law of 1789, has asserted a jurisdiction both over
human rights violations and major violations of inter-
national law, perpetrated by non-nationals overseas.
Such jurisdiction, with the possibility of ordering pay-
ment of damages, has been exercised with respect to
torture committed in a variety of countries (Paraguay,
Chile, Argentina, Guatemala), and with respect to other
major human rights violations in yet other countries.
While this unilateral exercise of the function of
guardian of international values has been much
commented on, it has not attracted the approbation of
States generally.213
The ATS has no equivalent in any other country of the
world.214 Indeed, various nations have on numerous occasions filed
complaints with the U.S. Department of State or submitted amicus
briefs to American courts arguing against extraterritorial application of
the ATS.215 In one case, the United Kingdom and Germany objected
2 12 id 63.
213 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, at 77; see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Ger. v. It.), 2012 I.C.J. 143 (February 3) (emphasis added) (where the ICJ also
rejected universal jurisdiction on state immunity grounds).
214 Attempts in the British Parliament to create a statute conferring universal civil
jurisdiction over torture have been opposed by the government as contrary to
international law. Memorandum Submitted by the Ministry of Justice to the Joint
Committee on Human Rights, Closing the Impunity Gap: UK Law on Genocide (and
Related Crimes) and Redress for Torture Victims, Twenty-fourth Report of Sess.
2008-2009, HL Paper, HC 553, Aug. 11, 2009, at Ev. 40.
215 See App. A to Brief of Amici Curae BP America et al. in Support of Respondents,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491),
www.courtappendix.com/kiobel/protests (last visited Dec. 25, 2012).
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that extraterritorial application of the ATS "infringes the sovereign
right of States to regulate their citizens and matters within their
territory." 216 The Australian and British governments also submitted
an amici brief in a recent case directly addressing extraterritoriality,
Sarei v.Rio Tinto, in which the governments argued that "there is no
basis in international law for the creation of an U.S. civil cause of action
involving disputes among aliens" and that "international law does not
permit the United States to exercise extraterritorial civil jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims bearing so little connection to the United States."217
It is certainly ironic that the U.S. civil litigation system stands
alone in the world in facilitating "international law" claims by
individuals while the American government is so reluctant to submit
itself to international human rights and international criminal law
instruments. John Bellinger, the former Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Department of State under President George W. Bush, has described
the U.S. as "something of a rogue actor":
We are perceived, accurately, as having in effect estab-
lished an International Civil Court - a court with juris-
diction to decide cases brought by foreigners arising
anywhere in the world, by the light only of its own
divination of universal law, and through the extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. law concerning rights and
remedies. By itself, this can be grating enough to
foreign governments. But it is especially so when taken
together with both the fact that the U.S. often argues
vigorously against the assertion by foreign courts of
universal jurisdiction to hear cases involving U.S.
officials and the fact that the U.S. has declined to join
216 App. B to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
4a, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919) 2008 WL
408389.
217 Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Commonwealth of Australia as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 7, 2, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.2d 736
(9th Cir. 2011) (No. 02-56256) 2009 WL 8174961.
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the International Criminal Court because of concerns
about that tribunal's jurisdiction.218
Ultimately, this is an area of relative uncertainty in interna-
tional law. There is, however, as Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal have observed, no rule of customary international law
prohibiting the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction. 219
As the following discussion on extraterritorial application of
the ATS shall seek to demonstrate, a better view is that the United
States may apply the ATS to "foreign-cubed" cases lacking a factual
nexus with the United States where the alleged conduct amounts both
to a violation of international law and where international law would
permit the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction over that act. The
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction under the ATS would therefore
effectively be limited to violations of jus cogens norms, such as torture
or genocide, or to cases where there are sufficient traditional jurisdic-
tional connections with the United States. Arguably, however, the
more decisive issue before the Supreme Court in Kiobel will be the
effect of federal law governing the extraterritoriality of U.S. statutes, to
which we now turn.
D. U.S. Law on the Extraterritorial Application of Acts of
Congress
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law is a matter of congres-
sional intent. Congress has the constitutional power to legislate
extraterritorially, 220 but United States statutes are presumed not to
apply abroad absent statutory language or legislative history indica-
ting a contrary intention.221 The Supreme Court has articulated three
rationales for restricting the extraterritorial application of U.S. legisla-
218 John B. Bellinger, Enforcing Human Rights in US Courts and Abroad: The Alien
Tort Statute and Other Approaches, The 2008 Jonathan I. Charney Lecture in
International Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 8 (2009).
219 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, 48.
220 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
221 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
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tion:222 avoidance of international conflicts; 223 assumption that
Congress aims to address domestic concerns; 224 and respect for the
separation of powers and relative competence of the Executive and
Legislative branches in the realm of foreign relations.225
In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "all legislation
is prima facie territorial." 226 Since the 1990s, the Supreme Court has
interpreted this presumption more strict and broadly than before.227 In
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
"a long standing principle of America law" requires that "legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."228 The 2010
decision of the Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd. is particularly relevant in the ATS context. In reaffirming the pre-
sumption that "when a statute gives no clear indication of extrater-
ritorial application, it has none," the Court reversed lower courts'
standard practice of construing the Securities Exchange Act 1934 to
apply extraterritorially in foreign-cubed Section 10(b) claims by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign defendants in connection with securities
traded on foreign exchanges. 229
The presumption against extraterritoriality is an offshoot of the
Charming Betsy canon, according to which U.S. courts will interpret an
ambiguous statute so as to avoid violating international law. 230 In
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall stated "an
Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains." 231 The Charming
Betsy rule is a firmly established rule of U.S. statutory interpretation. It
is reflected in section 114 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
222 See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT'L
L. 351, 379 (2010).
223 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagram, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
224 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
225 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993).
226 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
227 Knox, supra note 222, at 374.228 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
229 Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (emphasis
added).
230 Knox, supra note 222, at 352.
23 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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Law, which provides: "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is
to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States." 232
The Charming Betsy was cited in Justice Breyer's majority
opinion in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that an ambiguous antitrust statute should be
interpreted "to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations.... This rule of construction reflects princi-
ples of customary international law - law that (we must assume)
Congress ordinarily seeks to follow." 233
The Supreme Court has developed an exception to the
presumption against extraterritorially for criminal cases based on "the
purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the
crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and
jurisdiction of a government to punish the crime under the law of
nations."234 In United States v. Bowman, American and British
defendants were criminally indicted for conspiracy to defraud the
United States based on conduct that occurred at sea and in Brazil. The
Supreme Court applied U.S. law extraterritorially, holding that "Con-
gress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law
that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but
allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense." 235 Although the
subject matter of the ATS overlaps with matters traditionally the
concern of criminal law, there is no case law to suggest that the
Bowman exception inference could be applied to private law statutes.
The primary question in Kiobel will therefore be whether the
statutory presumption against extraterritoriality should apply to the
ATS. The Ninth Circuit,236 the Southern District of New York,237 and
various academic commentators238 have all made the argument for a
distinction to be drawn between the ATS and other federal statutes,
232 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115.
233 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
234 U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,97-98 (1922).
235 Id at 98.
236 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
237 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 246-47 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
238 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 54, at n.88.
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such as the Securities Exchange Act, on the grounds that the ATS
applies substantive international law, not U.S. law, and is therefore
subject to international jurisdictional law, which recognizes a right to
exercise universal jurisdiction over violations of the most serious inter-
national norms.239 There is neither a conflict of laws nor jurisdictional
overreach because all states have consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction over such violations of international law.240 One may argue
that the presumption against extraterritoriality would therefore only
come into play if, for example, the courts were to apply federal rules of
secondary liability for human rights abuses.241 The canon of construc-
tion that would apply if courts apply international law under the ATS
is the Charming Betsy 242 rule: a statute may not violate international
law. In order for "foreign-cubed" cases not to run afoul of Charming
Betsy, international law must grant universal jurisdiction over the
alleged violation of international law that is the basis for the ATS
claim.243
IV. THE ARGUMENTS ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY RAISED IN SAREI AND
KIOBEL
The question considered by the Supreme Court in the Kiobel
plaintiff's petition for certiorari concerned the "narrow" issue of the
liability of corporations under the ATS. However, numerous amicus
briefs submitted by interested governments and corporations in
support of the defendant-respondents sought to direct the Court to the
broader issue of the statute's extraterritorial application, arguing that
this was the more important question.244 Respondents' original brief
also argued as an alternative ground to its corporate liability points
that the ATS does not extend to conduct occurring within the territory
of a foreign state.245 The procedural order of March 5, 2012, suggests
239 Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REv.
1019,1082-1083 (2011).
240 Id at 1083-84.
241 Id at 1084.
242 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
243 Colangelo, supra note 239, at 1091.
244 Brief of Amici Curiae for BP America et al., supra note 31, at 11; Supplemental
Brief of Chevron Corporation et al., supra note 28, at 2.
245 Brief for Respondents, supra note 135, at 54.
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that these briefs have had the desired effect, with the Supreme Court
transforming Kiobel from a corporate liability suit that would have
been a mere set-back had plaintiffs lost,246 into a case that has the
potential to decimate the use of the ATS in international human rights
litigation before the U.S. courts.
In response to the Supreme Court's order, in June 2012 the
Kiobel plaintiff-petitioners submitted a supplemental brief arguing that
the ATS should be given extraterritorial effect.247 Respondents
bolstered their earlier arguments on extraterritoriality in supplemental
argument filed in August 2012.248 Further, as discussed later herein, the
United States has also submitted a new amicus brief, in which it
abandoned its earlier support for the plaintiff-petitioners.
A. Sarei
The extraterritoriality arguments raised by respondents and
their amici in Kiobel reflect many of the concerns raised in dissenting
and minority opinions of the Ninth Circuit in Sarci. Sarei was a foreign-
cubed suit, involving a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign defendant for
torts alleged to have occurred entirely in the territory of a foreign
state. 249 The defendant's only connection to the United States is that it
does business there.250 Although Rio's business activities in the U.S.
provided a sufficient basis for the constitutional exercise of personal
jurisdiction under the International Shoe line of authority, 251 the
minority in Sarei considered there to be "no nexus between the acts
complained of in this action and the United States." 252 In his dissent,
Judge Kleinfeld rejected the majority's opinion as amounting to an
exercise of universal jurisdiction "over all the earth, on whatever
246 Harvard Law School, The Future of Alien Tort Statute Litigation: a Talk by Paul
Hoffman (March 11, 2011), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2011/ 03/1 1paul-
hoffman-alien-tort-statute.html.
247 Petitioners' Supplemental Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 6.
248 Supplemental Brief for Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621
F.3d 111(2010) (No. 10-1491),2012 WL 3127285.
249 Sarei, 671 F.3d 736.
250 Id at 794 (Bea, J., concurring and dissenting).
251 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishing the
constitutional due process requirements of "fair play and substantial justice").
252 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 795 (Bea, J., concurring and dissenting).
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matters we decide are so important that all civilized people should
agree with us," and an assertion of "entitlement to make law for all the
peoples of the entire planet" in violation of the fundamental interna-
tional law principle of the sovereign equality of stateS253 -all in
disregard of the Charming Betsy rule requiring a statute to be construed
so as not to violate international law. 254 Judge Kleinfeld argued that the
ATS, interpreted in accord with the presumption against extraterri-
toriality, was intended only to remedy wrongs committed within the
United States.255 Compared to the express indications in the Torture
Victim Protection Act, he could see no evidence of congressional intent
that the ATS should apply extraterritorially. 256 Judge Kleinfeld also
refuted the majority's reliance on the 1795 Attorney General's advisory
opinion, because it concerned torts committed in a foreign land by
Americans, not foreign-cubed cases. 257
Judge Kleinfeld further suggests that the "only wrong the First
Congress could have possibly contemplated as providing for universal
jurisdiction would have been piracy".258 Furthermore, he elaborated,
the First Congress's intention to include piracy within the ambit of the
ATS cannot, after Morrison, support the statute's extraterritorial
application. 259 As in Justice Kavanaugh's dissent in the D.C. Circuit's
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil opinion,260 Judge Kleinfeld reasons that piracy
takes place on the high seas and is therefore distinguishable from the
exercise of jurisdiction over acts that take place in the territory of a
foreign sovereign, "because imposition of any state's law [over piracy
on the high seas] could offend no other state's governance of its own
territory." 261 The majority rejected this line of argument, noting that the
Supreme Court in Sosa sought to address concerns about respect for a
253 Id at 797-98 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
254 Id at 809-10 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
255 Id at 810 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
256 Id (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
257 Id at 811 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
258 Id at 808 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
2 59 Id at 809-810.
260 Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting in part) ("The high seas are jurisdictionally unique. They are 'the
common highway of all nations,' governed by no single sovereign." (quoting The
Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 371 (1824)).
261 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 798.
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foreign state's sovereignty by limiting ATS claims to violations of
universally accepted international norms.262
Although the Ninth Circuit in Sarei was concerned with
interpreting a U.S. statute and not discerning the international law of
universal jurisdiction, there is an interesting parallel to Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal's joint separate opinion in the Arrest
Warrant Case. There, these judges note that, though piracy is the classic
example of a crime subject to universal jurisdiction under international
law, this does not mean that universal jurisdiction is limited to crimes
committed outside the territory of a sovereign state. "Of decisive
importance is that the jurisdiction was regarded as lawful because the
international community regarded piracy as damaging to the interests
of all. War crimes and crimes against humanity are no less harmful to
the interests of all because they do not usually occur on the high
seas."263
Finally, Judge Kleinfeld considered the extraterritorial
application of the ATS to be politically unwise as well as legally
incorrect. 264 The issues that arise in such cases are inappropriate for
adjudication, he opined, because they encroach on the proper functions
of the political branches to determine U.S. foreign policy. 265 Judge
Kleinfeld also referred to an ATS case against North American and
European corporations relating to apartheid, claiming that the suit in
the United States was a threat to peace and reconciliation in South
Africa. 266
B. Kiobel
In their latest brief on the extraterritoriality question, the Kiobel
plaintiff-petitioners argue that existing doctrines of judicial restraint
developed by the federal courts in transnational civil litigation cases -
and perhaps also an exhaustion of local remedies requirement 267 -are
262 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
263 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, T 61.
264 Sarei, 671 F.3d 814 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
265 Id at 815-16 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 818 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (referencing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007)).
267 Petitioners' Supplemental Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 16.
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sufficient to dismiss inappropriate ATS cases, without the need for a
total bar on extraterritorial claims. 268 The petitioners also argue that
denying extraterritorial effect to the ATS: (1) is contrary to the intent of
the First Congress in enacting the ATS and contrary to Congress's
actions since then, particularly Congress's decision not to limit the ATS
following the Filartiga case and its decision to implement the TVPA;269
(2) has no basis in the circuits' decisions, all of which have rejected the
argument that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially; 270 (3) would
drive ATS claims into state courts as foreign transitory tort cases,
contrary to the First Congress's intent to create federal jurisdiction over
such claims in order to avoid the "parochial prejudices of state
courts"; 271 (4) is unnecessary to conform the ATS with the Charming
Betsy canon, because "the ATS represents an exercise of adjudicative
jurisdiction" over violations of international law and does not seek to
enforce American law but merely allows federal courts to decide cases
concerning universal customary international law norms that are
"binding in every country"; 272 (5) fails to appreciate that the human
rights norms at issue in the case are erga onines obligations under
international law, and that these universal rights form a sufficient
nexus with the United States when the parties are also present in the
U.S.;273 and (6) goes against the contemporary development of
international human rights law -both the trend confirmed in Filartiga
that the U.S. should not be a safe haven for perpetrators of human
rights violations, and the power granted to sovereign states under
international law to provide remedies for such severe human rights
violations, specifically through the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 274
Also in response to the Supreme Court's order for re-argument
on the extraterritoriality question, the Obama Administration has
surprised commentators by filing a new amicus brief in Kiobel that
departs from its previous position and is now in "partial support of
268 Id at 11.
269 Id at 14-15.
270 Id at 17.
271 Id at 19.
272 Id at 40.
273 Petitioners' Supplemental Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 40-41 (referencing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. o (1987)).
274 Id at 13.
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affirmance" of the Second Circuit's decision.275 The United States
continues to believe that a corporation can be a proper defendant in an
ATS claim, and that the judgment of the appellate court should
therefore be reversed.276 The United States also still believes that courts
may, pursuant to the ATS, recognize a federal common law cause of
action for certain violations of international law committed outside of
U.S. territory.277 Significantly, however, the United States has in this
latest amicus brief abandoned support for the Kiobel plaintiff-
petitioners, now arguing that a private right of action is not available
under the circumstances of the case, and that the plaintiffs' ATS claim
should accordingly fail.278 The new brief has also captured attention as
a result of the State Department's apparent decision not to sign it. That
decision, according to former State Department Legal Adviser John
Bellinger, is "a not-so-subtle message - more to the human rights com-
munity than the Supreme Court - that State did not agree with the
Justice Department position."279 Indeed, there is a definite ring of
realpolitik to the United States' argument, as evidenced by the brief's
opening statement:
[tihe United States has an interest in the proper appli-
cation of the ATS because such actions can have impli-
cations for the Nation's foreign relations, including the
exposure of U.S. officials and nationals to exercises of
jurisdiction by foreign states, for the Nation's commercial
interests, and for the enforcement of international
law.280
Nevertheless, the United States argues that there is no need for
the Supreme Court in Kiobel to resolve the extraterritoriality question,
and that "the Court should not articulate a categorical rule foreclosing
275 Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 32.
276 See id at 27.
277 Id at 6.
278 Id at 5.
279 Alison Frankel, Kiobel Brief Shows StateDOJ Split Over Human Rights Litigation,
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (June 14, 2012), http:// blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2012/06/15/kiobel-brief-shows-statedoj-split-over-human-rights-litigation/.
280 Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 2 (emphasis added).
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any such [extraterritorial] application of the ATS."281 Indeed, the U.S.
brief states that extraterritorial claims may, under certain circum-
stances, be consistent with Sosa.282 Furthermore, the brief affirms that
the decision in Filartiga "is consistent with the foreign relations
interests of the United States, including the promotion of respect for
human rights."283 Thus, Filartiga and its line of cases should, consistent
with Congressional action to date, remain good law, and new ATS
claims involving foreign conduct should be decided individually on a
case-by-case basis.284 Instead of developing its argument on extra-
territoriality and international law, the United States argues that the
actual issue in the case is the constitutional question of "whether a
private right of action should be created by the courts as a matter of
federal common law ... [which concerns] the allocation of responsibil-
ity among the Branches of the United States Government for the
creation of private rights of action under U.S. law."285
The United States' conditional support for extraterritorial
application of the ATS is of little avail to the Kiobel plaintiffs, however,
as the United States now believes that the Court should fully reject the
plaintiffs' claims:286
In this case, foreign plaintiffs are suing foreign cor-
porate defendants for aiding and abetting a foreign
sovereign's treatment of its own citizens in its own
territory, without any connection to the United States
beyond the residence of the named plaintiffs in this
putative class action and the corporate defendants'
presence for jurisdictional purposes. Creating a federal
common-law cause of action in these circumstances
would not be consistent with Sosa's requirements of
judicial restraint.287
281 Id at 4; see also id at n.1 I ("[T]he government urges the Court not to adopt ... a
categorical rule" against extraterritoriality.).
282 Id at 13.
283 id
284 See id. at 5-6.
285 Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at n.3.
286 See id at 21.
287 Id at 13-14.
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The brief continues, arguing that federal courts that are
"engaged in judicial law-making should not recognize a cause of
action that is significantly more expansive in this respect than the
express extraterritorial cause of action created by Congress" in the
TVPA. 288 However, the United States, without elaboration, leaves open
the question of whether a cause of action could stand against a U.S.
national or corporation for aiding and abetting conduct by a foreign
government on its own territory, or generally for acts of foreign
sovereign outside its territory or on the high seas.289 (In their supple-
mental brief, the Respondents attack this "malleable" qualification as
being incompatible with the Morrison presumption against extrater-
ritoriality.)290 The United States brief seeks to distinguish Filartiga on
the grounds that the U.S. cannot be said in Kiobel to be harboring a
torturer or "enemy of mankind" found residing in its territory.291
Although the U.S. has sufficient contacts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the Kiobel defendants, these corporations are nationals
of Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.292 Implicitly
disavowing moral leadership, the United States takes the view that, "if
foreign nations with a more direct connection to the alleged offense or
the alleged perpetrator [i.e. the United Kingdom, Netherlands or
Nigeria] choose not to provide a judicial remedy, the United States
could not be faulted by the international community for declining to
provide a remedy under U.S. law."293
The U.S. administration's argument remains consistent with its
previous position on the compatibility of the ATS with international
law, which is a matter of considerable debate among foreign govern-
ments and within the larger international law community, as noted in
the introduction. In a footnote in its brief, the United States asserts that,
regardless of Kiobel, no doubt should exist about the American
government's right under international law to impose civil or criminal
2 88 Id at 21.
289 id
290 Supplemental Brief for Respondents, supra note 248, at 35; see also Supplemental
Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 3-4, 8, 33-36.
291 Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 19.
292 See generally id. (making repeated references to these nations).
293 Id at 20.
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sanctions for torture committed in foreign territories. The footnote also
expressly states that "[tihe United States does not suggest that an
extraterritorial private cause of action would violate international law
in this case." 294 But the U.S. government does not provide any
supporting argument for this claim, instead seeking to guide the Court
away from extraterritoriality and towards the constitutional separation
of powers as the basis for deciding the case. The United States does,
however, assert that traditional transnational litigation doctrines such
as forum non conveniens, act of state, and the political question doctrine,
should be applied with "special vigor" in ATS claims involving extra-
territorial conduct, particularly where there is a weak nexus between
the U.S. and the territory where the conduct complained of occurred.295
Indeed, the United States suggests that the courts should not approach
forum non conveniens with the restraint characteristic of non-ATS
transnational civil litigation, and that dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds "should not be the rare exception."296 Furthermore, the
United States argues that Kiobel is an appropriate case for a mandatory
exhaustion-of-local-remedies requirement in order to demonstrate
respect for foreign sovereigns and to avoid conflict in regards to
foreign relations.297
In their original pleadings submitted before the Supreme Court
made its March 5 order for re-argument, Respondents and their amici
had already raised the extraterritoriality question, arguing that the
lower courts' interpretation of the ATS: is contrary to U.S. rules on
statutory interpretation designed to respect international comity and
uphold America's international obligations; 298 violates international
law and is contrary to the fundamental principle that international law
does not condone the unilateral exercise of jurisdiction by one state
over foreign non-consenting states;299disregards the principle of
separation of powers by permitting judicial interference with questions
implicating U.S. foreign relations,3 00 thereby ignoring the Supreme
294 Id at n.3.
295 Id at 22, 24.
296 Id at 24.
297 Id at 22.
298 Brief for Respondents, supra note 135, at 54 55.
299 Supplemental Brief of Chevron Corp. et al., supra note 28, at 3.
300 Id at 28-30.
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Court's restrictive Sosa approach to the recognition of federal common
law causes of actions derived from customary international law
norms;3 01 and risks further conflict with foreign nations because ATS
claims involve allegations of misconduct by foreign governments. 302
In both their original brief and their new supplemental brief on
extraterritoriality, Respondents urge the Supreme Court to apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality in the Morrison line of cases as
well as the Charming Betsy rule that a statute should be interpreted in
compliance with international law.303 "Few cases could be more
remote from the circumstances that promoted the First Congress to
enact the Alien Tort Statute."304 Neither the language of the ATS nor its
historical context overcomes the Morrison presumption.3 05 The two
canons of interpretation, Respondents argue, foreclose the extension of
the ATS to a foreign-cubed case such as Kiobel, and the practice since
1980 of the federal courts in granting extraterritorial effect to the ATS
should be reversed.3 06
The amici brief of Chevron Corporation et al., authored by
Harvard Law School professor Jack Goldsmith, claims that interna-
tional law does not recognize universal civil jurisdiction.307 For
support, Goldsmith refers to the House of Lords' consideration in Jones
v. Saudi Arabia of the Convention Against Torture, which requires
states parties to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over torturers
found within their territory, but does not indicate extraterritorial
application of Article 14, which provides for compensation for victims
of torture.30 8 The Respondents' supplemental brief also cites the Jones
decision and notes the scarcity of other authorities as support for the
proposition that universal jurisdiction applies to criminal, but not civil
jurisdiction.309 Hence, Respondents argue, "universal civil jurisdiction
301 Id
302 Brief of Amici Curiae for BP America et al., supra note 31, at 5, 15.
303 Brief for Respondents, supra note 135, at 54--55; Supplemental Brief for
Respondents, supra note 248, at 12.
304 Supplemental Brief for Respondents, supra note 248, at 1.
305 Id at 7.
306 Id at 1, 3.
307 Supplemental Brief of Chevron Corp. et al., supra note 28, at 12.
308 Id at 13; Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 T 25.
309 Supplemental Brief for Respondents, supra note 248, at 40-44.
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has not been universally accepted, as Sosa and Charming Betsy
require."31 0
The Goldsmith brief also rejects the opinion in Sarei that the
ATS "provides a domestic forum for claims based on conduct that is
illegal everywhere, including where that conduct took place" 311 and
therefore does not intrude on the sovereignty of foreign states.
Goldsmith argues that the lower courts have used the ATS jurisdiction
to impose federal common law causes of action to extraterritorial
conduct. This is not genuine international law but "a globally unique,
judge-made U.S. law to regulate the activities on foreign soil contrary
to the consent of nations."3 12
The British and Dutch governments note in their joint amici
brief for Kiobel that they "have maintained over a long period of time
their opposition to overly broad assertions of extraterritorial civil
jurisdiction arising out of aliens' claims against foreign defendants for
alleged activities in foreign jurisdiction that caused injury" on the
grounds that "such exercises of jurisdiction are contrary to interna-
tional law and create a substantial risk of jurisdictional conflicts." 313 In
reviewing the case law on the presumption against extraterritoriality in
statutory interpretation, the governments suggest that the presump-
tion should also be applied to common law claims under the ATS.314
They observe that the lower courts have been asserting jurisdiction in
ATS cases without a "sufficiently close connection" to the United
States and in respect to claims for violations of international law that
go beyond the strict Sosa test of no less "definite content and accep-
tance among civilized nations than the 18k-century paradigms."315
These governments urge the Supreme Court to set jurisdictional limits
to the ATS and also to provide guidance on whether plaintiffs should
be required to exhaust local remedies even where a sufficient factual
nexus sustained United States jurisdiction under international law.316
3 0 Id at 44.
3.. Supplemental Brief of Chevron Corp. et al., supra note 28, at 5.
312 Id at 15.
313 Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain et al., supra note
37, at 2.
3 14 Id at 29 30.
315 Id at 3 1 .
316Id at 32.
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The exhaustion of local remedies point is an important one.
While requiring plaintiffs to have exhausted remedies in the more
closely connected forum before pursing an ATS claim would not
assuage all concerns about foreign-cubed jurisdiction, it would
demonstrate U.S. respect for the jurisdictional interests of other states
(unless such efforts would be futile or the plaintiffs were subject to a
denial of justice in the natural forum). This would also be consistent
with Congress's decision to include the exhaustion requirement in the
TVPA. 317 The rule about exhaustion of local remedies is grounded in
international law's recognition that a state may have an interest in
hearing a case that involves its nationals or acts on its territory. 1 8 The
view that justice is best served locally is expressed in the International
Criminal Court's principle of complementarity, whereby the court only
has jurisdiction if those states with a territorial or national connection
to the crime are "unwilling or unable genuinely" to investigate and, if
necessary, prosecute. 319 Likewise, the Princeton Principles on universal
criminal jurisdiction give priority to territorial jurisdiction, because
"societies that have been victimized by political crimes should have the
opportunity to bring the perpetrators to justice, provided their
judiciaries are able and willing to do so."320 In Sosa, the Supreme Court
observed that an exhaustion requirement might be warranted in ATS
cases when "appropriate." 321 In the first en banc hearing of Sarei by the
Ninth Circuit in 2008,322 a majority of the panel considered that there
was no "absolute" exhaustion requirement under the ATS,323 but the
controlling plurality opinion by Judge McKeown nevertheless
recognized a role for "[pirudential exhaustion" where the claim has
only a weak nexus to the United States and "do[es] not involve matters
of 'universal concern'." 324 Judge Reinhardt, dissenting, objected that
"[n]o rule of domestic or international law requires plaintiffs who are
3 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, supra note 206, at Section 2(b).
Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 158.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17(1), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
320 PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUB. AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 53 (2001).
321 Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, at 733 n.21.
322 Sarei, 550 F. 3d 822.




alleging serious violations of human rights to exhaust local remedies
when there is evidence that plaintiffs would further risk their lives by
doing so."325 On remand, the district court held that "it would be
inappropriate to impose a prudential exhaustion requirement on Plain-
tiffs' claims for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and racial discri-
mination," but that there was an exhaustion requirement in regards to
the other claims for violations to the rights to health, life, and security
of the person; cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment; international
environmental violations; and a consistent pattern of gross human
rights violations.326
Donovan and Roberts note that the exhaustion requirement
"should not be uncritically converted into conditions that might block
the exercise of universal jurisdiction," but note that it could effectively
be employed as a means of respecting the interests of a state with
traditional jurisdictional connections to the claim, provided that state is
able to provide justice.327
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT FUTURE FOR THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE ATS?
In light of the current composition of the Supreme Court, it
seems unlikely that the outcome of Kiobel will turn on international law
as opposed to American law.328 If, however, one accepts that the ATS
implicates public international law (both substantively, as shown by
the claims of torture and extrajudicial killing made by the Kiobel
plaintiffs, and procedurally in the sense of the permissible exercise of
universal jurisdiction by U.S. courts), it is important not to lose sight of
how international law norms are interpreted and developed - a
process to which domestic courts have always been central. 329 In the
epilogue to his thought-provoking monograph on public international
325 Id. at 842 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
326 Sarei, 671 F. 3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2011).
327 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 159.
328 See generally Lori F. Damrosch, Main Essay - Medellin and Sanchez-Llamas:
Treaties from John Jay to John Roberts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE SUPREME
COURT: CONTINUTY AND CHANGE 452 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey and
William S. Dodge, eds.).
329 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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law, From Apology to Utopia, Martti Koskenniemi asks, "[wihy is it that
concepts and structures that are themselves indeterminate nonetheless
still end up always on the side of the status quo?"330 Koskenniemi
suggests that legal institutions are structurally biased to prefer certain
outcomes, and that legal rules make that which is contingent and
contestable seem natural or unavoidable. 331 For example, it can be
argued that, "while domestic courts in the West sometimes extend the
jurisdiction of domestic anti-trust law, they rarely do this with domes-
tic labour or human rights standards, though nothing in the standards
themselves mandates such distinction." 332 These claims are, of course,
contestable. But the American legal realist tradition has also long
viewed law and politics as fundamentally inseparable; hence, the
American aversion to judge-made law (as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Sosa) as compared with England and Europe, where legal
realism never fully took hold.333 Within the narrow space that has been
left open for debate in the federal courts (the door left "ajar subject to
vigilant doorkeeping," in the words of Justice Souter334), the question is
how (or why) judges will justify their decisions when faced with
compelling arguments from both sides.
To characterize the judicial application of customary rules of
international law in United States courts as "judicial imperialism 335" is
misguided. 336 Long before the era of international courts and tribunals
was ushered in by the Hague Peace Conferences, international law was
given effect to by domestic courts, and domestic courts have always
had a role in shaping international law as well. 337As the joint separate
3o M. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 606 (2d ed. 2005).
Id. at 606-07; see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1998)
(exploring, in the Critical Legal Studies tradition, the role of political ideology in law
making).
332 Koskenniemi, supra note 330, at 608.
3 3 See generally Guglielmo Verdirame, The Divided West: International Lawyers in
Europe and America, 18 EuR. J. INT'L L. 553, 562 (2007).
334 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
Sarei, 671 F.3d at 818 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
See supra note 20 for a discussion on customary international law in U.S. courts.
337 Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomas J. Schoenbaum, J.D., Ph.D., in Support of
Petitioners at 4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. 2d. (2010) (No. 10-
1491), 2011 WL 6962954; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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opinion in the Arrest Warrant Case concludes, state practice (including
the decisions of domestic courts) "is neutral as to the exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction,"3 38 but the trend is towards a greater acceptance of
the principle.339 Therefore, there is no rule of international law prohibi-
ting the extraterritorial application of the ATS. One need not subscribe
to an overly-liberal interpretation of the Lotus principle 40 to reach this
conclusion. Moreover, there appears to be little justification on the
grounds of respect for international comity, state sovereignty, or the
separation of powers for prohibiting the exercise of universal civil
jurisdiction with regards to violations of so-called peremptory norms,
which arguably include the prohibitions on piracy, war crimes, geno-
cide and torture, over which international law recognizes a right to
exercise universal criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, this would be largely
consistent with the restrictive approach to the recognition of federal
common law causes of action taken by the Supreme Court in Sosa.
The ATS is more vulnerable under the presumption against
extraterritoriality than it is under the Charming Betsy canon. In light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, and the ideologically-
charged nature of the debate, the future of the ATS most certainly
Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, 45.
3 Id 52.
340 S.S Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). "[Tlhe first
and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that - failing the
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any
form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it
cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule
derived from international custom or convention. It does not, however, follow that
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it
cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and
acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed
States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under
international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to
the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this
respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most suitable." Id. at 18-19.
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hangs in the balance. It is well settled under U.S. law that Congress has
the power to legislate extraterritorially, 341 but evidence of the First
Congress's intent in enacting the ATS has been lost in history. The 1795
Attorney General's opinion referenced in Sosa suggests that, at the very
least, Congress intended the ATS to apply to claims against U.S.
defendants for violations of international law committed in a foreign
state. 342 A more ambitious, but still highly plausible, argument,
advanced by the Kiobel petitioners, 343 is that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should not apply to a statute that applies interna-
tional law; the ATS is "a vehicle for the enforcement of universally
applicable international norms," so there is no conflict of laws or
jurisdictional overreaching when it is applied extraterritorially. 344
Underlying this debate is the political concern that corporate
defendants are being unfairly targeted in United States courts. The
federal courts have a variety of tools at their disposal to ensure that
ATS cases that neither have traditional jurisdictional connections to the
United States, nor meet the high threshold for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction under international law (that broadly corresponds to the
test articulated in Sosa), are removed from the docket. As the United
States' amicus brief in support of the Filartiga plaintiffs made clear, a
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is appropriate where a
remedy is available in a forum having more established jurisdictional
connections than the U.S. court.345 The United States' latest Kiobel brief
also adopts this position.346 As the ICJ has counseled, a due
consideration must be paid to the jurisdiction of other states when a
state is considering the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 34 7 Donovan
and Roberts propose a "balancing test," which would consider the
availability of a remedy in the forum with traditional jurisdictional
links and would be open to submissions by the affected state.348 U.S.
341 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
342 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721.
343 Petitioners' Supplemental Opening Brief, supra note 93, at 35.
344 Colangelo, supra note 239, at 1088.
345 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at n.48.
346 Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 28.
347 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, T 59.
348 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 159. This might raise questions such as
whether to respect an amnesty granted in respect of peremptory crimes committed in
that country as part of a process of peace and reconciliation.
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courts could also find in the customary international law requirement
that the plaintiff first exhausts local remedies, a requirement that
already exists in the TVPA.
In the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal observed:
One of the challenges of present-day international law
is to provide for stability of international relations and
effective international intercourse while at the same
time guaranteeing respect for human rights. The diffi-
cult task that international law today faces is to provide
that stability in international relations by a means other
than the impunity of those responsible for major
human rights violations. 349
For the Supreme Court to overrule over thirty years of
precedent would be a major blow to the fight against impunity. Critics
suggest that diplomacy is the more appropriate path,350 but progress
by such means has been measured in decades, if at all. The ATS has
had an immediate, revolutionary impact on the enforcement of inter-
national human rights norms. Yet it has not brought down the
international order, nor does it threaten to do so. In fact, it is
remarkable how little attention the ATS has received outside the
American legal system and academy.351 Moreover, the vast majority of
ATS cases have historically been dismissed on forum non conveniens or
349 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 10, 5.
3 50See Bellinger, supra note 218, at 8 (describing the "diplomatic costs" of ATS
litigation). "Beyond the ATS... we also need to focus on the many other tools the U.S.
government, and in particular the State Department, can use to prevent and redress
human rights abuses. Some of these are tools of persuasion - for example, the State
Department's annual human rights reports, which review countries' human rights
practices and focus attention on reported abuses. The State Department also conducts
quiet and public diplomacy, in bilateral and multilateral fora, and administers a variety
of programs intended to foster development of the rule of law in other countries - a
critical aspect of preventing and redressing human rights abuses." Id
3 Kenneth Anderson, Bleg: What Do Non-US Legal Scholars Think about ATS
Doctrines?, OPINIOJURIS, (April 19, 2009), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/04/19/ bleg-
what-do-non-us-legal-scholars-think-about-ats-doctrines/.
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other procedural grounds.352 The case in which the fate of the ATS will
be decided concerns corporate defendants. They are typically multi-
national companies that have already had to accept broad assertions of
personal jurisdiction in conventional transnational litigation before
U.S. courts, based on very weak jurisdictional contacts arising out of
the global nature of their business activities.353 In this light, the claim
that extraterritorial ATS cases will have a "chilling" effect on foreign
direct investment is less compelling. 354 If the Supreme Court pursues
the extraterritoriality question to its end, it will face a clear choice:
effectively kill the ATS and thereby grant immunity from civil suit to
those who commit human rights abuses abroad; or re-establish clear
limits on the kind of claims and circumstances in which it is
appropriate for U.S. courts to take an extraterritorial ATS case. Such a
decisions would be aligned with the developing international law of
universal jurisdiction and the United States' long-avowed commitment
to the promotion of respect for human dignity, regardless of territorial
boundaries.
352 K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 2 T.J.I.L. 40
n.6 (2004).
3 53See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (deciding
that the minimum contacts required for jurisdiction between the forum and a foreign
corporation were satisfied on a "stream of commerce" theory).
354 Brief of Amici Curiae BP America et al., supra note 31, at 2.
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